

Roles of the International Community for Peace on the Korean Peninsula

JOINT ENTRY

Style: Analytical

Reference Style: Chicago Style

Arya Ranjan

Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi

Undergraduate

Bachelor of Arts, Korean Studies

Amitanshu Kumar

Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur

Undergraduate

Bachelor of Technology, Electrical Engineering

Introduction

History has encountered the most fateful and tragic of all the world disputations i.e., separation of the Korean peninsula into two states. 70 years down the line, and the peninsula continues to remain divided to this date. What began as a rivalry between the outside forces ended up in a unified Korea's fallout. Circumstances built up in a fashion that sparked off a series of events, which today, have become a worldly concern.

In a setting where globalization is at its pinnacle, it is crucial to perpetuate harmonious balances within all the countries. However, a ground as large as the world is bound to have conflicts. An acute scarcity as the disintegrated Korean peninsula attracts apprehension from worldwide. The issue, in itself, is entangled in complexities and there are intricacies which one must understand in order to decipher the core.

History tells the tale of the two Koreas who had a split up with no say of theirs in the first place. The thirst for regional power led the South Korea controlled U.S. and North Korea controlled Soviet Union to pick up on enmity. One occurrence triggered another, and that is how partitioning took place on the 38th parallel. While studying the Korean peninsula, it must be noted that the Koreans were not the initiators of the division; in fact, they had sought for a reunification thereafter soon. The establishment of communist and anti-communist sentiments on the northern and southern sides of the border, respectively, has consequentially produced the current scenario. With North Korea burgeoning its nuclear profile and scope, the world remains under one big umbrella of threat.

“There is no path to peace. Peace is the path.”

-Mahatma Gandhi

The attribute of peace is fundamental to the world and the leaders around the globe have joined hands to ensure that it is accomplished. Parties sharing an interest in the issue

have come together to reach purposeful resolutions. Dialogues are being conducted among all the stakeholders. Direct associators, as well as other parties have realized over the years how world peace is at stake and the amount of hazard it poses. The two Korean leaders, in question, have been showing an eager participation in the inter-Korean summits. Parties with vested interests such as the U.S, China, Russia, and Japan play an important role in the affair.

The essay is devised with an intent to bring on the table the facets of diplomacy, and the governance of the leaders involved. A critical analysis will be drawn from the existing situations and a likelihood will be formulated regarding the peace and the eventual unification. The essay will explore various perspectives and endless possibilities that emerge as one examines through it. The focus will particularly lie on the roles of the international community for peace on the Korean peninsula.

Six Party Nations: Mains and Beneficiaries from the International Community

North Korea- A Sign of Danger

North Korea's approach to peace, since the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, has been to attain regime security. The rise and prosperity of a democratic Republic of Korea (ROK) and U.S. strategic commitments to ROK has dreaded the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) for long. The DPRK inspirations synchronize with the aims of other parties involved i.e., to gain maximum benefits while incurring negligible losses.

Despite the fact that the essential objectives of the Kim Jong-un leadership have not been clear over time, it unquestionably pines for authenticity as "real" Korea and craves to be welcomed by the worldwide circle like its southern partner. North Korean meaning of denuclearization appeared to be not the same as others and an extended thought of The Five

Conditions for Denuclearization Policy made in Rodong Sinmun¹: “(i) a US declaration of all nuclear weapons in the South; (ii) complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization in South Korea; (iii) a withdrawal of the US nuclear umbrella from the Korean Peninsula; (iv) guarantees from the USA that it would never use nuclear weapons on the Peninsula; and (v) a gradual withdrawal of US forces from the Peninsula.”²

Pyongyang accepts that denuclearization ought to be the result, rather than the prerequisite, for improving bilateral relations between North Korea and the U.S. Meanwhile, North Korea intends to pressurize the United States into ending its “hostile” policy by elevating tensions on the Korean Peninsula and expanding its influence through nuclear and long-range missile testing, and generously improving relations with China, Russia, and other nations.³ Numerous U.S. specialists are worried that North Korea will probably focus on keeping up its nuclear deterrent for as far as might be feasible on the grounds that it has given Pyongyang the ideal worldwide status that it might not have accomplished otherwise and it is the best assurance of national sovereignty and regime security, except if he gets an ironclad security, alongside other material advantages.⁴

North Korea, lately, has seemed to have shifted its prime focus to economic advancement despite its public accentuation on security guarantees and diplomatic normalization. It has adopted UN Security Council Resolution, 2270 in March 2016 and has targeted gaining relaxation from the intense UN sanctions for the civilian economy. This shift in strategy prioritizes economic development rather than developing nuclear weapons and

¹ The official North Korean newspaper of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea.

² Fifeild, A., “North Korea’s definition of “denuclearization” is very different from Trump’s,” The Washington Post, 9 April 2018.

³ KCNA Watch, “report on 5th Plenary Meeting of 7th Central Committee, Workers’ Party of Korea,” January 1, 2020, www.kcnawatch.org/newstream/1577829999-473709661/report-on-5th-plenary-meeting-of-7th-c-c-wpk

⁴ Uri Friedman, “North Korea Says It Has ‘Completed’ Its Nuclear Program,” The Atlantic, November 29, 2017, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/11/north-korea-nuclear/547019.

economy (byungjin) at the same time.⁵ North Korea believes in common acknowledgment of every nation's equality and power, which can be accorded through normalization, and has shown readiness to surrender its atomic weapons in the Panmunjom Declaration.⁶

South Korea- The Pacifier

The ROK, today feels confident enough to seek a more independent and bold stance in the regional picture long after being dismissed by the DPRK as a 'US lackey'. South Korea continues to have lively internal discussions on attitudes to its northern nemesis-cum-partner, ranging from strong adversarial positions to those who would like to see more use of 'soft penetration,' and perhaps even some who suspect both Koreas' common interests being caught in between great powers.⁷

South Korea has consistently served as a peace-broker and went about as an impetus for the political progressions that occurred over the last year in between North Korean and American leadership. Facing a genuinely difficult dilemma, the country is trying to balance the desire for long-term reunification and peaceful coexistence, on one hand, with the possible economic collapse of the DPRK and protection against the militant ideological adversary, on the other. Contingent upon which kind of political leader is in office, South Korea's methodology towards North Korea diverges. Moon's positioning is fairly liberal in approach, being a progressive leader from the left, and has emphasised on bridging a direct association rather than a concept of isolation.

⁵ National Committee on North Korea (NCNK), "Kim Jong un's 2019 New year's address," January 1, 2019, www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/kimjongun_2019_newyearaddress.pdf.

⁶ "Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula," Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Republic of Korea), 27 April 2018.

⁷ Snyder, S. A., *South Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers* (Chichester, West Sussex; Columbia University Press, 2018).

The current Moon Jae-in administration reinvigorated a new “Moonshine policy,”⁸ highlighting mainly three principles. The top-most priority being the renunciation of all military activities in the peninsula, considering it a North Korean incitement or a US prudent activity. Second, President Moon believes that peace will follow only after North Korea’s denuclearization and immovably can’t help contradicting the moderates for indigenous atomic weapons or redeploying US tactical weapons. Finally, it emphasizes that both North and South Korea must play the leading roles without any third-party intervention on the Peninsula.

In recent years, Seoul’s multidimensional engagement policy with Pyongyang has seen to be yielding some tangible, albeit dubious, fruits in terms of moderation and improvement especially of human relations. Under the leadership of Moon Jae-in, ROK realizes how procuring trust is a gradual process that develops over time. The South’s invitation to North Korea to the February 2018 Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang was welcomed with open arms which prompted three back-to-back North-South summits and an elaborate military cooperation on reducing strain in the peninsula.⁹ Further, Seoul has pursued non-political exchanges and economic cooperation with the North, advancing potential between Korean railway lines seeking the reunion of separated families and energy projects¹⁰ for mutual prosperity.

⁸ Pacheco Pardo, R., ‘Moon on a Mission: South Korea’s New Approach to the North’, *The Diplomat*, 14 March 2018.

⁹ Frank Aum, Jacob Stokes, Patricia M. Kim, Atman M. Trivedi, Rachel Vandenbrink, Jennifer Staats, and Joseph Y. Yun, *A Peace Regime for the Korean Peninsula* (Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace, 2020), 18, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/pw_157-a_peace_regime_for_the_korean_peninsula-pw_0.pdf

¹⁰ Padden, B., ‘S. Korea Plans to Start Railway Project With North This Year’, *Voice of America*, 15 August 2018.

United States- The Significant Stakeholder

The United States, by a long shot, is the strongest external competitor to sway the strategic game and bring peace and harmony to the region. The U.S. perspective primarily focuses on the dire need to keep up the U.S. tactical presence in the Asia-Pacific region and also to dispose off North Korea's nuclear weaponry. The U.S. believes denuclearization as the key and certainly a precondition to any developments in the security situation on the peninsula.

President Donald Trump's U.S. diplomacy is historically unprecedented and phenomenal, not blindly following the footsteps of past U.S. administrations. The new Trump government grandstands another level of American unconventionality as his administration has concocted a more aggressive and prompt approach to peace and denuclearization of North Korea prioritizing it as a top security concern. Advancing on the platform set by the earlier Obama administration,¹¹ The current regime under its "maximum pressure and engagement" strategy continues to threaten military action, by positioning key U.S. military resources to the regional theatre and significantly increasing North Korean sanctions to hold influence and increase leverage.¹² Furthermore, he used worldwide public opinion to shame Russian and Chinese organizations conducting business with North Korea and imposed unparalleled sanctions to restrict them from doing so.¹³

Nonetheless, by June 2018 Singapore Summit, President Trump moved towards a fastened approach, by engaging in talks, exchanging letters and meeting directly with Chairman Kim thrice in thirteen months. He limited preconditions for talks and gave

¹¹ Klimas, J., 'Trump's North Korea strategy: A lot like Obama's', Politico, 8 August 2018.

¹² In President Trump's first sixteen months in office, the Treasury Department issued 182 sanctions designations; during the two terms of the Obama administration, it issued 154 (Mathew Ha, "Let's face it, North Korea won't yield without more pressure," The Hill, March 21, 2019, www.thehill.com/opinion/international/435056-lets-face-it-north-korea-wont-yield-without-more-pressure).

¹³ 'North Korea: Trump accuses China of allowing oil transfers', BBC News, 29 December 2017.

noteworthy concessions in advance as a goodwill gesture hoping to seek peace and denuclearization at the same time. These means have scrutinized North Korea's seriousness about denuclearization.¹⁴

It is evident that if any arrangement is to get an opportunity of endurance, it certainly involves a 'human rights' element. While human rights issues have been dormant in the negotiations and stay torpid all through media scrutiny, it is conceivable that if North Korea commits any such violations of human rights in the future, it would undoubtedly infuriate the U.S. and affect the course of action it undertakes. Washington and Pyongyang have both learned their lessons from Libya's Model although they have yet to discuss the human rights component openly. The threat of mass brutality against common people, after all, was the main reason that demolished the arrangement between the Gaddafi reign and the West. North Korea will have to improve relationships with its civilian population, moderate the restraints and focus on economic development of their state if any arrangement is to get an opportunity of a long haul achievement.

China- A Support System to the DPRK

The other significant entertainer presuming a prime function in the North-East Asian¹⁵ front is China who regardless of its previous faltering, presently appears to be very intrigued to make an improved provincial security structure as a result of the Six-Party Talks. Through the Shanghai process and the SCO, China has learnt its lessons and become confident of its arbiter role by acquiring practical experience in multilateralism. Beijing has not been blind

¹⁴ 'Issue Briefs: Toward an Effective Deal on Denuclearization and Peace with North Korea', Arms Control Association, 8 June 2018.

¹⁵ Patricia M. Kim, "China's Quest for Influence in Northeast Asia," in *Strategic Asia 2019: China's Expanding Strategic Ambitions*, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Willis (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2019), www.nbr.org/publication/chinas-quest-for-influence-in-northeast-asia-the-korean-peninsula-japan-and-the-east-china-sea.

and although being quite familiar and exasperated by North Korea's volatile qualities, continues to entertain Pyongyang being its chief advocate-cum-partner.

Beijing has consistently been suspicious about North Korea's atomic program, in spite of being North Korea's just military partner and principal trading ally for far long ("as close as lips to teeth," as the saying goes). Broadly speaking, the Chinese policy makers' perspective towards the North Korean issue diverges into three sorts. First are the traditionalists who recognise North Korea as a strategic asset originated during the Korean War. Second are the strategists who see the threats of North Korea growing as a rogue regime with nuclear powers at its expense and supports USA's efforts to denuclearize the North. At last, the centrists enjoy the middle ground and will in general tend to support denuclearization measures as long as it doesn't fire back and undermine North Korean rule. The current Xi Jinping government is seen as a centrist one.

Beijing's core interest has always been to assist DPRK maintain its supreme control over North Korea for as long as possible to forestall the idea of U.S. dominated unified Korea – a constant fear in the heart of Pyongyang. China's concern in the wake of sudden regime collapse¹⁶ prevents it from robustly creating pressure on North Korea to denuclearize. First and foremost, there would be huge cross-border movements of refugees and North-Korean migrants into China. Even in the best case scenario,¹⁷ the scope of strategic miscalculation will increase significantly creating room for conflict on its border. The ideal outcome for China would be to create a new China-allied North Korean regime based on the Chinese system, rather than losing its buffer state and possibly looking towards a U.S.-allied unified

¹⁶ Bush, Richard. "China's Response to Collapse in North Korea." Brookings, Jan 23, 2014, <https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/chinas-response-to-collapse-in-north-korea/>

¹⁷ Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?, 269, 281, 285; Doyle and Sambanis Quantitative Analysis further finds that UN missions with a mandate and resources to build peace increase the chance for peace after civil war, controlling for levels of hostility and local capacities (Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace, 4)

Korea on its borders. Also, China's prosperity and economic stability¹⁸ would be adversely affected by uncertain political approach and security infrastructure of a unified Korea. An obvious preference for Beijing for sustainable security would be to continue being engaged in high-level talks with the U.S. with a gradual, but cautious approach towards achieving peace in the peninsula, since from the Chinese viewpoint, any process tending to gain time has virtue in itself.

Beijing enacting its role as a "legit dealer" between Pyongyang and Washington has urged each side to make corresponding concessions to ingrain trust in the bilateral negotiations. China represents "a new type of great power" which has never stretched out its nuclear umbrella to any other nation and has shown practically no interest in making formal alliances or security guarantees.¹⁹ It supports the idea of a dual freeze or freeze-for-freeze policy which sees to the fact that North Korea freezes its nuclear activities in return for freeze in joint U.S-ROK military exercises.²⁰ This was intended to parallelly keep both countries focused on keeping negotiations in track to resolve peace and denuclearization issues.

Japan- The Sidelined Party

Japan's relations with North Korea, in the post Cold-War era, have reflected Tokyo's willingness to act unaided by Washington and Seoul and in gaining regional leverage over Beijing and Moscow. Japan has been growingly marginalized in the crisis on the Korean Peninsula and felt a little left out and thus, has sought a secondary role in the negotiations to restore international law.

¹⁸ Bonnie Glaser, Scott Snyder and John Park, Keeping an Eye on an Unruly Neighbor: Chinese Views of Economic Reform and Stability in North Korea.

¹⁹ Simon Denyer and amanda erickson, "Beijing warns Pyongyang: you're on your own if you go after united States," Washington Post, august 11, 2017, www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-warns-north-korea-youre-on-your-own-if-you-go-after-the-us/2017/08/11/a01a4396-7e68-11e7-9026-4a0a64977c92_story.html.

²⁰ 'US Rejects "freeze-for-freeze" proposal from China, Russia to break North Korea impasse', Straits Times, 7 July 2017.

Since the 2002 declaration, in which Japan expressed remorse and guilt for its colonial rule and atrocities committed in the past and North Korea admitted to abducting Japanese native citizens,²¹ successive Japanese administrations had two prime objectives: complete dissolution of North Korea's weapons of mass decimation, and undivided determination to finally resolve the abductees' issue. Despite the fact that the first objective lines up with US interests, Tokyo's emphasis is on Pyongyang's shorter-range missile abilities which Washington has ignored over longer-range dangers. In light of homegrown general sentiment, Japan still keeps on looking for a full accounting of the remaining twelve Japanese abductees.²²

Japan still holds some cards in its hands and has judiciously used them from time to time to incentivize North Korea to resolve the abductees issue, which Prime Minister Abe believes is the primary objective of negotiations. To begin with, it has substantial influence over multilateral sanctions in the UN. Second, it offers to lift some of its own restrictions on Pyongyang. At last, it promises to provide economic aid and investment as "compensation" once CVID and a peace regime have been realized.

Japan needs to look towards the bigger picture on the off chance that it needs a say in the multilateral negotiations involving intense conversations dedicated towards establishing a stable security regime in the region. It likewise wants a strategic framework where it can dedicate its resources without agonizing a lot over North Korea towards China, which poses

²¹ Ministry of Foreign affairs of Japan, "Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration," September 17, 2002, www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/pmv0209/pyongyang.html.

²² Ministry of Foreign affairs of Japan, "The Inter-Korean Summit, Statement by Foreign Minister Taro Kono," April 27, 2018, www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002016.html.

long-term security threat to Japan.²³ Abe pronounced that he is determined to take all means to resolve the conflict and wishes direct face-to-face negotiation between the concerned sides.

Russia- The Opportunist

In the wake of events leading to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union and the end of communism, Russia lost its influence over its former ally and thus, no longer plays a first-hand role in the Korean context. Be that as it may, so as to grandstand its capacity on the global discussion, it continually looks for approaches to introduce itself as a "fixer" to determine the contention.²⁴ The rapidly growing North Korea's nuclear power bothers Russia as it poses a threat not just to South Korea, but has also led to instability in the regime, increasing US military bases in the region and armed conflict. Moscow promotes de-escalation of tensions through dialogue among all interested parties but is quite skeptical at the same time towards the Kim's regime and its readiness to surrender the only leverage it has "nuclear weapons".

From a broader perspective, the reinforcement of Sino-Russian "comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination" is one of the key incentives for cooperation on North Korea policy. Both the powers intend to debilitate the U.S-ROK union and damage the U.S-drove territorial security foundation.²⁵ To realign their goals towards economic development, Moscow wants to witness the development of the Russian Far East (RFE) sharing border with North, link South Korean railways, and the Trans-Siberian railroads, and develop Trans-Korean pipelines in order to meet its growing demand for energy exports in the Asian market

²³ Tim Kelly, "Japan lists China as bigger threat than nuclear-armed North Korea," Reuters, September 26, 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-defence/japan-promotes-china-as-bigger-threat-than-nuclear-armed-north-korea-iduSKbN1WC051.

²⁴ Ramani, S., 'Why is Putin backing North Korea? To build up Russia as a great power', The Washington Post , 26 July 2018.

²⁵ Artyom Lukin, "Russia's Game on the Korean Peninsula: accepting China's rise to regional Hegemony?" Special report no. 78, National bureau of Asian research, March 2019, 21–30, www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/sr78_china_russia_entente_march2019.pdf.

and has signed a joint agreement with Pyongyang to increase trading activities to US\$10 billion by 2020.

Russia plans to see a steady unification of the North into the South to maintain peace on the peninsula. This being in accordance with US policy, it is in striking contrast with the China's that desperately wants to maintain the status quo of the two Koreas. Russia's position may be more confounded than would initially show up as it has frequently been liberal and has alleviated North Korea with strategic as well as monetary help in troublesome occasions under extreme situations. Overall, A reunified Korea might resonate with Russia's intentions; nonetheless, the questionable direction and China's surging influence and power in the region have confined Russia's strategic autonomy to its bounds.

Recent Summits & Position of Talks: The New Developments

The years of 2018-19 have demonstrated an extensive series of engagements between the inter-Korean parties. The Singapore summit of 2018 between the U.S. and DPRK was a revolutionary step toward bringing North Korea on the negotiating table. President Trump showcased an unparalleled sense of confidence in persuading North Korea into starting a conversation. The 2019 Hanoi summit posed a boost in the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). Exchanges were made from both U.S. President Donald Trump and ROK President Moon Jae-in to Kim Jong-un regarding the pressing issues. It was an optimistic stride in the direction of balance and harmony between the two Koreas.

South Korea, being a middle power in the region, must practice caution in its diplomatic gestures. The U.S-ROK alliance has, for years, been a strength-binding factor. Since the Trump administration came into being, the alliance has faced a blow which has led to its weakening around the periphery. A sharp dig was taken at the U.S. troop presence on

the South Korean front, and a proposal to withdraw the same was put out.²⁶ Considering the security framework of South Korea, it must not tamper with China in that regard. The tarnishing of U.S-China relations has incapacitated South Korea to launch staunch solidarity with either of the two. China's heavy influence around the Korean peninsula and its backing of the DPRK is an alarming reminder for the ROK as to not upset China.

North Korea, in recent times, has shifted its focal point from nuclear proliferation to economic development. Though the DPRK places its firm belief in *Juche*²⁷ or the concept of self-reliance, it cognizes the criticality of earning a space in the global map. In an economic dearth, DPRK seeks out necessary resources and support from the international community.²⁸ In exchange, it seems convinced to make amendments in its elaborated nuclear program. However, minute to no revision has been done in that route so far. On an additional basis, it is all demands for a heavy sanction relief despite the lack of alterations in denuclearization of the state. The bottom-line of the current position of talks, and a straight outcome of summits is that very little is being done to push forward the proposition of permanent peace attainment on the peninsula.

Proposed Solutions: How to Build Confidence on the Korean Peninsula?

In the process of bringing irrevocable peace on the Korean peninsula, the international community could act as an intermediary to accelerate and promote harmony. It is to be understood that peace, in itself, does not come in a day. Rather, it is a continued exercise of constructing trust that will lead to peace. The international community, in close collaboration

²⁶ Chung Min Lee, "The Chimera of Peace on the Korean Peninsula," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, March 18, 2020, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/03/18/chimera-of-peace-on-korean-peninsula-pub-81231> .

²⁷ Foster Klug, "Juche rules North Korea propaganda, but what does it mean?", AP News, September 30, 2019, <https://apnews.com/article/d63d00ce9de042dc88b9df2c40be53ee> (accessed October 9, 2020).

²⁸ Frank Aum, Jacob Stokes, Patricia M. Kim, Atman M. Trivedi, Rachel Vandenbrink, Jennifer Staats, and Joseph Y. Yun, *A Peace Regime for the Korean Peninsula* (Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace, 2020), 18, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/pw_157-a_peace_regime_for_the_korean_peninsula-pw_0.pdf

with South and North Korea, can take into account the situation at various levels and devise tools and measures for building confidence.

1. **The DMZ issue:** One of the most disputed sites in the world, the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) continues to project a plausible threat. Drafts have been prepared in favour of turning the DMZ into an international hub for peace. Healthy exchanges in the form of awareness campaigns, historical sessions and talks in spirit could take place in a phased manner between Seoul and Pyongyang. Extending the issue, there could be a systematic breakdown of the heavy military base on both sides of DMZ to lock in the confidence.²⁹ In practicality, the entire operation and the implementation will require a thorough step-by-step analysis. Once North Korea overcomes its fear of threat and enmity, and South Korea achieves reliance from the northern portion of the peninsula, the matter will begin to get simplified.

2. **Frequent cultural interchanges:** The most effective method to bring about mobility is to make common people engage. Both the Korean leaders could organize programs under the abovementioned scheme and ensure dense participation. The subsequent events could be held outside of Asia. Enthusiastic international communities could host the same, which, in turn, would increase the flow. Renowned academicians could be gathered on the table from both the sides to formulate ideas and design instruments that could push the peace agenda. Both DPRK and ROK could mutually cooperate to dedicate an area for carrying out such activities.³⁰

Taking a step ahead, Seoul and Pyongyang must set their eyes on venturing into joint military, naval, and sea exercises. The move will generate the quality of

²⁹ Zdzislaw Lachowski, Martin Sjögren, Alyson J. K. Bailes, John Hart and Shannon N. Kile S, *TOOLS FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA*, (Sweden: SIPRI and the Center for Security Studies, 2007), 57.

³⁰ Lachowski, Sjögren, Bailes, Hart and Kile S, *Tools for Building Confidence on the Korean Peninsula*, 42-47

‘oneness’ on citizens on both sides of the border. The proposal might sound ambitious in its nature as of the moment, nevertheless, it is certainly possible if ROK and DPRK remain spirited in their mutual understanding.³¹

3. **Settlement of forbidden issues:** Earnest efforts must be made to rectify the past adversities so as to renew the present relationships. The Korean war left a distaste among states; hence, issues that were previously untouched should spring up now to put an end to any discontent. Since the intervention of the international community will be sought, it is proposed to form a wide cover for the peace agreement that would settle “North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programs, the replacement of the Armistice Agreement, human rights, the role of the United Nations, and the establishment of both transitional and permanent systems for managing the peace on the Peninsula and in the region.”³²

4. **Armistice agreement’s replacement:** The Armistice Agreement of 1953 was a signatory document that took in account all the shareholders’ consent for not resorting to armed instruments and hostilities. By the end of the Korean war, irreparable damage had been done, which made it necessary that this agreement came into being until a permanent peace treaty was achieved. However, to this date, the Armistice continues to exist. The Panmunjom Agreement of 2018³³ had proposed for numerous issues that must be looked into and not delayed any further. One of them stated the

³¹ Lachowski, Sjögren, Bailes, Hart and Kile S, *Tools for Building Confidence on the Korean Peninsula*.

³² Frank Aum, Jacob Stokes, Patricia M. Kim, Atman M. Trivedi, Rachel Vandenbrink, Jennifer Staats, and Joseph Y. Yun, *A Peace Regime for the Korean Peninsula* (Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace, 2020), 18, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/pw_157-a_peace_regime_for_the_korean_peninsula-pw_0.pdf

³³ NCNK, “Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain,” September 21, 2018, www.ncnk.org/sites/default/files/agreement%20on%20the%20Implementation%20of%20the%20Historic%20Panmunjom%20Declaration%20in%20the%20Military%20Domain.pdf.

establishment of a proper peace regime on the Korean peninsula which would, unarguably, mark the onset of a new era.

The dialogues have followed a crooked trajectory since then. North Korea, containing explosive properties, literally and metaphorically, has been experimenting with its nuclear capacities. DPRK's disorientation with the pact has sparked concern. A formal peace agreement, if and when comes into play, will cease the intimidation. Hence, it is important to replace the Armistice.

5. **An emergence of the third party into the scene:** Amongst all the interpretations and resolutions, an argument of accommodating neutral groups in the international community rises. The parties are not supposed to have a major political stake in the dispute; however, they could lie in close proximity with the countries on the negotiating table. Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) comprises countries with no inherent interest of their own. India, as a matter of fact, was celebrated during the Korean war, since it provided paramedical services to both ROK and DPRK and played an important role in mediating between the conflicting groups.³⁴ Canada, among other countries, though, has not directly advocated for the peace on the peninsula, keeps a keen notice of patterns surrounding international peace and security.³⁵ Other European countries such as Switzerland and Sweden can be contestants if a step as this is considered in the future.

Peace will come when confidence of the highest order gets registered within the parties. North Korea, being highly dubitable of the intentions of anybody outside of its

³⁴ Lakhwinder Singh and Youngjun Kim, "India's role in peace building process in Korean Peninsula," Asia Times, July 3, 2020, <https://asiatimes.com/2020/07/indias-role-in-peace-building-on-korean-peninsula/>

³⁵ Bedeski, Robert. "Peace and Neutrality on the Korean Peninsula: A Role for Canada?" *Pacific Affairs* 73, no. 4 (2000)

territory, is hard to please. The exhibit of unpredictable behavioural patterns and misconducts makes it a tricky party to deal with. The Moon government has, although, succeeded in pursuing relations with the DPRK on diplomatic front. However, a humongous pile of tasks lies ahead of both the countries. It will only be interesting to witness how the incidences pan out in the coming years.

Conclusion

The essay discusses the prospects of establishing peace and the methodologies of acquiring the same. Owing to the priorities of each of the actors outside of the peninsula, it is to be visualized that deviations in the basic desires of every party involved is what widens the gap. A string of commonality, in the same sense, is what leads to parties promoting the collective desire. As contemplated over, all the countries but North Korea regard absolute denuclearization as the foundational base on the road toward peace. North Korea, however, shuns off the understanding of others and comes up with its own twisted terminology and logic. The DPRK administration wants a 'barter system' to come into play, fair and square, and proportionate in nature. The atmosphere around these inconsistencies gives birth to the current talks being on a halt. North Korea, being on the flipped side of all the other parties, is both intimidated and willing to take a step further. The contradiction in its own wanting is what is stopping the DPRK from gaining serious momentum.

South Korean president, Moon Jae-in, is a passionate leader who is not headstrong in his ways. A unique feature that sets apart the current government from the previous ones is how President Moon discards passiveness and seeks spirited involvement from the North's side. Maintaining its ground of strong dismantling of the nuclear weapons, ROK provides North Korea with incessant assurances of respecting its boundaries, and exhibits no intent of

applying force for unification.³⁶ The escalating tensions surrounding the ROK in terms of foreign troop presence and nuclear holdings is diminishing the entire purpose of coming to a peaceful purchase.

Investigating from the angle of China-U.S. clashes, it is well-known how both the nations lie on the polarising ends of one scale. Being the two super-systems of the world, things have been going downhill with them. If both the Koreas continue to stand in a position where they are both clutched in the hands of the U.S. and China, respectively, it is possible that the Korean peninsula will not unite in a long time.³⁷ To settle an issue as grave as this, the U.S. and China must stand in solidarity and support the peace proposal, keeping aside their power preferences and ideological differences.

“Peace is not a state of tranquillity. Peace can come about only through dialogue and numerous meetings, by taking bold actions that make the impossible possible, and by persistently looking for reasons why it is preferable.”

-Moon Jae-in

“As I walked over here, I thought ‘why was it so difficult to get here?’ The separating line wasn’t even that high to cross. It was too easy to walk over that line and it took us 11 years to get here.”

-Kim Jong-un, Panmunjom Peace Summit, April '18.

³⁶ Aum, Stokes, Kim, Trivedi, Vandenbrink, Staats, and. Yun, “A Peace Regime for the Korean Peninsula.”

³⁷ “North Korean policies of Moon Jae-in administration,” Arirang News, 2017, YouTube Video, 4:57. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kh15MnpA0Ko>

It was realized quite a while ago how both the parties are pushing in a peace program. Nothing concrete has yet come out of their coalition, blame to be pinned on the regional and international discrepancies. North Korea, on the other hand, showcases unparalleled doses of unpredictability in its posture. In the most recent happening, Kim Jong-un was seen being remorseful for his choices. Later, in the same conference, he made new announcements of their nuclear shoot-ups.³⁸ It is this irregularity that has complicated an underway peace regime. The sequenced solutions and other themes will merely remain inked on paper, if North Korea does not come out and about. When a situation as similar as this does arrive, the United Nations (UN) will have a large share to its name. It will encourage everyday commutes and commercial reciprocity. However, due to historical miscalculations, the UN must clear the air and not appear inclined in its stance towards South Korea.³⁹

Peace on the Korean peninsula is very much inevitable. The *good riddance* (divided Korean peninsula) will not only be determined by futuristic evaluations, but also the uniformity the nations in question exhibit in their conduct. A strong inauguration of permanent peace is what will set the base for further consideration of reunification. The two Koreas will have to integrate for good; it is only a matter of time when the world spectates this remarkable happening.

³⁸ “Tearful Kim Jong Un offers rare apology to North Koreans,” The Indian Express, accessed October 13, 2020, <https://indianexpress.com/article/world/kim-jong-un-apology-north-korea-covid-19-6721829/>

³⁹ Lachowski, Sjögren, Bailes, Hart and Kile S, *Tools for Building Confidence on the Korean Peninsula*.

Bibliography

- Aum, Frank; Stokes, Jacob; M. Kim, Patricia; M. Trivedi, Atman; Vandenbrink, Rachel; Staats, Jennifer and Y. Yun, Joseph. *A Peace Regime for the Korean Peninsula*. United States Institute for Peace, February 2020, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/pw_157-a_peace_regime_for_the_korean_peninsula-pw_0.pdf
- Bennett, Bruce and Lind, Jennifer. “The Collapse of North Korea,” https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/sites.dartmouth.edu/dist/f/255/files/2013/12/Lind_Collapse.pdf
- Bush, Richard. “China’s Response to Collapse in North Korea.” Brookings, Jan 23, 2014, <https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/chinas-response-to-collapse-in-north-korea/>
- Byrne, Thomas and Corrado, Jonathan. *Making North Korea Creditworthy: What Will It Take for North Korea to Finance Its Post Nuclear Development?* Korea Society, June 19, 2019, 34, www.koreasociety.org/images/pdf/Making.North.Korea.Creditworthy_Final.report_byrne-Corrado.pdf.
- Chung Min, Lee and Botto, Kathryn. *Unification Blue Book: Reconceptualizing U.S.-ROK Cooperation in Korean Unification: A Stabilization Framework*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Lee_Botto_UBB_final.pdf.
- Fouse, David. “Japan’s Post-Cold War North Korea Policy: Hedging Toward autonomy?” Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, February 2004, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a446653.pdf>.
- Hemmings, John; Pachego Pardo, Ramon; and Yan Kong, Tat. *Negotiating the Peace: Diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula*. London: Henry Jackson Society, 2018. <https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/31433/1/Negotiating-the-Peace-Report-FINAL-JP%281%29.pdf>
- Kim, Hyun Kyung; Li Patrick, Joy; Tom O’Bryan, Mayoh. *Peace and Prosperity on the Korean Peninsula: Getting China to the Table*. Cambridge: Harvard Kennedy School, April 2017, <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Peace%20Prosperity%20Korea%20PB%20-%20web.pdf>
- Lachowski, Zdzislaw; Sjögren, Martin; J. K. Bailes, Alyson; Hart John; N. Kile Shannon; Mason, Simon; and Mauer, Victor. *Tools for Building Confidence on the Korean Peninsula*. Switzerland: SIPRI and ETH Zurich, 2007, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/32308/korea_report_complete.pdf
- U.S. Department of Defense, *Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2018, <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/14/2002079292/-1/-1/1/EXPANDING-GLOBAL-ACCESS-REPORT-FINAL.PDF>.