

PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The NUAC Asia Pacific Assembly

Alexander Christopher Mitchell Hynd

UNSW Sydney

Postgraduate Student, PhD International Relations

Topic: Major barriers to South and North rapprochement

Reference style: APA

Word count: 4943

Overcoming the Trust Barrier to Inter-Korean Rapprochement: Towards a Trusting Relationship on the Korean Peninsula?

Introduction

In a moving December 2000 speech in Oslo marking his acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize, former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung acknowledged that, during the previous half century, ‘South and North Korea have lived in mutual distrust’. At the same time, President Kim celebrated progress made at the first inter-Korean leadership summit held five months previously, where he and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il had agreed to ‘work together to expand peaceful exchanges and cooperation and build peaceful coexistence’ (Kim D.J. 2000). Two decades on, with Seoul and Pyongyang having experienced new highs and new lows in their relations, the problem of how to overcome the trust barrier between these two states remains central to attempts to build towards peace, denuclearisation, and ultimately reunification. This paper offers an assessment of efforts since 2018 to build upon the legacy of Kim Dae-jung by developing increased levels of trust between South and North Korea.

Both policymakers and scholars have ‘long recognized a link between trust and the peaceful resolution of interstate disputes’ (Hoffman 2002, 375), and trust building has become a crucial aspect of thinking about inter-Korean relations. Every South Korean leader since Kim Dae-jung has publicly emphasized the need for trust building with the North (Davenport 2013; Korea Herald 2013; Kim T.H. 2018), but for a decade after 2008 this rhetoric was no longer matched with substantive actions. Inter-Korean summits were not held, joint projects were shut down, and military tensions steadily built up. As one commentator noted of President Lee Myung-bak, ‘while he underscores pragmatism, dialogue and cooperation with the North on the one hand, he gives an impression favoring

military confrontation and absorptive reunification based on regime collapse on the other' (Moon 2011, 17). However, the election of current President Moon Jae-in in May 2017, who offered an agenda of genuine and substantive engagement with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (hereafter 'Chairman Kim'), provided an opportunity for trust building efforts to resume (Straits Times 2017).

In this paper, I examine how President Moon has attempted to build trust between South and North Korea, and I give a preliminary assessment of how successful these attempts have been. Taking into account recent developments in academic theorizing about the role of trust in the international realm, I argue that while inter-Korean relations have not yet reached the level of a trusting relationship, trust between President Moon and Chairman Kim has been strengthened and sustained since 2018. Moreover, I claim that the Moon administration's actions have been instrumental in creating a *new normal* on the Korean Peninsula, in which both sides have begun to take into account the core interests of the other when making key decisions. The argument presented here is supported by a review of major inter-Korean agreements from 2018, as well as international and domestic media reporting, academic work and think tank reports.

The remainder of this paper consists of three main sections. The first explores recent academic literature on the concept of trust in international relations. It distinguishes between trust and trusting relationships, and outlines three conceptualisations of trust, each of which offers potential insights into the way it operates on the Korean Peninsula. The second section categorises three levels at which trust has slowly been built since 2018: between individual leaders, between civil and military institutions, and between societies. Finally, the concluding section offers a preliminary assessment of the Moon administration's attempts to overcome the trust barrier, and calls for flexibility in steadily building trust at each level of interaction between the two Koreas.

Trust and international relations

International relations scholars have conventionally viewed trust as playing a predominantly negative role in the international realm, with mistrust given as the driving force behind the field's security dilemma concept (Kydd 2007; Haukkala et al. 2018, 1; Forsberg 2018, 162). However, more recent scholarship has also highlighted the concept's positive aspects, demonstrating that 'trust has proven to be as much a boon as a curse in international relations' (Stiles 2018, 2). Observing the presence and strength of trust in inter-state relations is complicated by the fact that it is an abstract concept, and much like other highly consequential concepts in international relations, such as power, it is difficult to quantify (Forsberg 2018, 159).

For Stiles, the key question necessary to understand the presence of trust in international relations is 'will another actor look out for my interests when taking actions I cannot control that directly affect me?' (2018, 2-3). Scholars have also sought to distinguish between this concept of 'trust' as a belief that an actor can be relied upon to avoid harming another's interests, and so-called 'trusting relationships'. Trusting relationships are to be found in formal or informal agreements under which one or more actor is granted an element of power over another's interests, with the expectation that it will not violate those same interests (Hoffman 2002, 376-377). While it is possible, therefore, that two leaders could demonstrate high levels of personal trust in each other through their words and deeds, their respective states could not be said to be in a trusting relationship unless this trust is subsequently converted into an agreement in which one or both actors are given increased power of discretion over the other's interests (Hoffman 2002).

For Lipson (2003) democratic states are potentially more trustworthy than authoritarian ones, due to their tendency to follow through on their international agreements with one another. However, this greater trustworthiness does not apply when democracies are

dealing with authoritarian states, as ‘leaders’ decisions to comply are constrained/enabled by both their own domestic institutional constraints and those of the other party to the agreement’ (Chyzh 2014, 4). A useful example of this is the US’ recent decision to unilaterally withdraw from an agreement with an authoritarian regime, in the form of the Iran nuclear deal (Landler 2018), which is likely to have deepened Pyongyang’s mistrust of Washington as a negotiating partner (Kretschmer 2018).

Following Ruzicka & Keating (2015) and Haukkala et al. (2018), conceptualisations of trust in international relations can be categorized into three main approaches: the rational choice approach, the social constructivist approach, and the psychological approach.¹ These conceptualisations are not mutually exclusive, but they do accentuate different aspects of trust in the international realm. The rational choice model views trust as a calculated and highly-logical assessment of risk (e.g. Kydd 2000), based not on one’s own interests but instead on an assessment of the interests of the other actor(s) (Haukkala et al. 2018, 2). As Hardin explains, ‘you trust someone if you have adequate reason to believe it will be in that person’s interests to be trustworthy in the relevant way at the relevant time’ (1993, 505). For adherents of the rational choice model trust is, in essence, a form of bargain made visible by cooperation (Ruzicka & Keating 2015, 15).

Rejecting this emphasis on pure logical calculation, the social constructivist model instead stresses the influence of identities, norms and rules in the performance of trust, with a logic of appropriateness (see March & Olsen 2011) guiding expectations of behaviour (Ruzicka & Keating 2015, 15). According to this approach, trust ‘includes trustors’ perceptions that their trustees have a responsibility to fulfill the trust placed in them even if it means sacrificing some of their own benefits’ (Hoffman 2002, 379). For Haukkala et al., the

¹ While this tripartite typology captures the dominant approaches to trust in international relations, it is far from complete. According to Forsberg, other approaches include ‘biological, hormonal, neuropsychological, and psychoanalytical’ (2018, 161).

key insight of the constructivist approach is its ‘focus... on shared meanings and interpretations concerning trust’ (2018, 3). Finally, the psychological approach highlights the particular ‘psychological predispositions and emotions of actors engaging in decision-making (Ruzicka & Keating 2015, 18). This approach emphasises the emotional aspect of trust, defining it as ‘a feeling of optimism in another’s goodwill and competence’ (Mercer 2005, 95). Interestingly, for Mercer, shared identity can be a source of trust building, which allows actors to ‘solv[e] collective action problems’ (2005, 95).

Drawing on the insights of all three approaches, I argue that trust between South and North Korea includes elements of a rational pursuit of interests, combined with a belief that actors will seek to match expectations of how they should behave, and also is at times an emotional response, stirred by a shared Korean identity. Both Korean states have much to gain in economic and security terms from developing a trusting relationship, as has been demonstrated by the history of the jointly operated Kaesong Industrial Complex, and the tragic record of military clashes along the inter-Korean border. At the same time, speeches, agreements, and performative actions from the leaders of South and North have repeatedly drawn on shared understandings of national identity.

Importantly, trust and mistrust can be found to operate at different levels of international relationships, whether between individual leaders, institutions, or at a society-wide level (Haukkala et al. 2018, 1). Depending on the specific circumstances and domestic location of power in a given system, it may be crucially important to generate trust at a particular level. For instance, it matters little if a particular leader trusts their international partner to a deal if that deal is then vetoed by a legislative body, or rejected in a referendum (Stiles 2018, 4). In the following section, I evaluate the Moon administration’s attempts to build a trusting relationship with North Korea in three major areas: in the individual relations

between leaders of North and South; in relations between key civil and military institutions; and at a wider societal level.

Building trust on the Korean Peninsula

Long-term collective action problems on the Korean Peninsula include the construction of a peace regime, denuclearization, and ultimately moving towards reunification through further political and economic integration. However, progress is unlikely to be made towards a trusting relationship embodying these goals unless the actors involved are first able to generate high levels of trust, at multiple levels of interaction, that are the prerequisite for a deep trusting relationship. Below, I outline the actions taken by the Moon administration since 2018, in cooperation with North Korea, to build trust in three mutually reinforcing levels: individual trust between leaders, trust between civil and military institutions, and trust between societies.

Trust between leaders

The need to establish trust between individual leaders in Seoul and Pyongyang is accentuated by the nature of the two states' political systems. In the case of North Korea's personalistic authoritarian regime, Kim Jong Un has, like his father and grandfather before him, 'ruled with absolute authority' (Albert 2020). Meanwhile, the South Korean system is liberal-democratic, and therefore the position of president has important constitutional constraints, but it is nevertheless 'endowed with enormous powers' (Lee & Botto 2018, 3). At an individual level, President Moon has also benefitted from historically high levels of public support throughout his term in office (Jung 2020), as well as from a severely fractured conservative opposition (Lee & Botto 2018, 3), that has boosted his power. In this context, attempts since 2018 to build trust between these two powerful decision makers have been a

necessary starting place to the development of a broader trusting relationship between Seoul and Pyongyang. Among the key instruments used by President Moon to develop trust with Chairman Kim have been four face-to-face meetings, the establishment of a direct phone line of communication between their two offices, and the exchange of multiple personal letters.

While former South Korean Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun each held one summit with their North Korean counterparts, President Moon has, to date, met with Chairman Kim four times. Their first meeting took place on April 27, 2018, on the South Korean side of Panmunjom, which is located along the inter-Korean border. Kim stepped over the military demarcation line into the South, prompting Moon to ask, ‘You have come to the south side, when will I be able to come to the North?’ In an unplanned improvisation, Kim then invited Moon to briefly follow him over the border into the North, saying ‘Maybe this is the right time for you to enter the North Korean territory’ (Hunt & Jeong 2018). Moon obliged, leading to an iconic initial moment of trust building between them. During the summit that followed, the two leaders’ body language demonstrated an active attempt to build trust, with Moon and Kim engaging in ‘a lot of hugging, smiling and handshaking’ (Noack & Lee 2018). Moon and Kim’s shared identity also played a facilitating role in strengthening trust between the two, with the two native Korean speakers able to hold a 30-minute private one-on-one conversation without the need for interpretation (Berlinger et al. 2018).

An impromptu second Moon-Kim summit took place on the north side of Panmunjom on May 26, 2018, with President Moon attempting to mediate between Pyongyang and Washington while simultaneously pushing ahead with plans to fulfill agreements made in the Panmunjom Declaration (Kim T.H. 2018). Moon and Kim’s body language once again clearly demonstrated attempts to build trust, with the two ‘exchanging a huge bear hug and broad smiles’ (Kim T.H. 2018). Moreover, the fact that this summit was organized with only

24-hours' notice suggests that a small but significant degree of trust had already been established, enabling this degree of flexibility.

President Moon subsequently travelled to Pyongyang for a longer, three-day summit from September 18-20, 2018. During his stay, Moon drew attention to the results of his prior interactions with Kim, stating that 'We have built trust and friendship between us, so I think all will be well' (Haas 2018). After signing new agreements, this third summit ended with Moon and Kim, accompanied by their spouses, visiting the top of Mount Paekdu—which is seen in Korean mythology as the birthplace of the Korean people (Shin & Lee 2018). In this sense, trust building between Moon and Kim was once again facilitated by their shared Korean identity. Finally, after fledgling relations between North Korea and the US were shaken by the abrupt ending to a February 2019 Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi, President Moon took part in a three-way summit with President Trump and Chairman Kim on June 30, 2019—once again held on the south side of Panmunjom. At this time, Moon took advantage of his improved relationship with Kim to facilitate dialogue between Pyongyang and Washington, effectively playing host to private talks between Kim and Trump (George et al. 2019). Further setbacks in negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang have inevitably had a negative impact upon inter-Korean relations, and a fifth Moon-Kim summit has not yet materialised. Yet President Moon has not given up on further face-to-face talks, and at the start of 2020, he publicly insisted that he is 'willing to meet repeatedly and talk ceaselessly' with Chairman Kim to build trust with the North (AFP 2020).

In addition to these leadership summits, President Moon has sought to increase personal communication and trust with Chairman Kim through the installation of a direct phone line between the South's Blue House and the North's State Affairs Commission on April 20, 2018. The line is reportedly similar to that previously used by former South Korean Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun to contact then North Korean leader Kim Jong

II, though updated to include the capacity for video calls (Yang & Shin 2018). During the first Moon-Kim summit in Panmunjom, President Moon stated that ‘Through regular meetings and direct telephone conversations, Chairman Kim Jong Un and I will discuss matters and build trust’ (Cheong Wa Dae 2018). It is not publicly known if the line was thereafter used between the two leaders. However, in June 2020, North Korea announced via state media that it would be severing the hotline, along with other communication lines, amid worsening ties with Seoul and Washington (Johnson 2020).

In contrast to these somewhat stalled efforts to build ever greater levels of individual trust through face-to-face meetings and telephone calls, the exchange of personal letters has been an enduring and sustained form of trust building between President Moon and Chairman Kim. In February 2018, President Moon hosted Chairman Kim’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, at the Blue House, where he received a letter from Chairman Kim (Reuters 2018a)—setting in motion the first Panmunjom summit. At the close of the same year, a letter from Kim to Moon voiced ‘much regret’ for his failing to visit Seoul in the preceding months, and called for the two leaders to meet ‘frequently’ the following year (BBC 2019). Then, after President Moon’s mother passed away in October 2019, he received a message from Chairman Kim expressing ‘deep...condolence[s]’ (AP 2019). Moon responded by sending his own letter to Kim, inviting him to attend a meeting between South Korea and ASEAN in the city of Busan. Although Kim ultimately rejected this appeal, a statement from the North underlined that it was ‘grateful’ for the invitation, and praised Moon’s personal letter for having ‘contained... sincere trust’ (Hankyoreh 2019). Later, at the height of South Korea’s coronavirus pandemic outbreak, President Moon received a new letter from the North Korean leader, in which Chairman Kim reportedly ‘conveyed his message of comfort to the South Korean people who are battling against the outbreak of COVID-19’ and stated ‘his unwavering friendship and trust toward President Moon’ (Salmon 2020). More recently still, in September 2020

President Moon wrote to Chairman Kim, pointing to their shared identity as the basis of trust and mutual support against the pandemic, saying that ‘We will cheer each other up together as compatriots and overcome it’ (Kim J. 2020). Responding days later, Kim told Moon that he wanted to ‘share the difficulties and pain with the South and always be with [South Korean citizens]’ (Kim J. 2020).

Altogether, President Moon’s attempts to build trust with Chairman Kim have been somewhat successful. Despite many fresh challenges emerging since early 2019, at a personal level the two leaders have maintained positive and trusting personal communications now for over two and a half years. However, while Moon and Kim are essential players in driving progress in inter-Korean relations, they are far from being the only domestic actors of consequence when it comes to building trust on the peninsula. The following section examines attempts to build trust between the two states’ civil and military institutions.

Trust between civil and military institutions

Interactions between South and North Korean civil and military institutions dramatically increased in 2018, largely due to the political agreements being driven through by President Moon and Chairman Kim. In particular, three written agreements were of critical importance in attempts to build trust at this level: The Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula (hereafter ‘Panmunjom Declaration’), signed at the first Moon-Kim summit in April 2018; and the Pyongyang Joint Declaration and Comprehensive Military Agreement, both of which were signed at the third Moon-Kim summit in September 2018.

The wording of the Panmunjom Declaration leant heavily on Seoul and Pyongyang’s shared Korean identity, stressing a desire to ‘reconnect the blood relations of the nation’ and referencing ‘the destiny of our nation’ (MOFA 2018). Among its many agreements was the

creation of a joint liaison office, to be jointly staffed by representatives of both states' civil bureaucracies. It also agreed to the holding of joint commemoration events, with guests to include members of their respective 'authorities, parliaments, political parties, local governments and civil organizations' (MOFA 2018). The Panmunjom Declaration also sought to build trust between the two states' powerful militaries, agreeing to 'stop all the hostile acts' and to create a 'peace zone' along the inter-Korean land and maritime borders (MOFA 2018). It agreed 'to hold frequent meetings' between key senior military figures, that would allow trust to be exercised while resolving any future border clashes amicably. Following up on this, multiple rounds of high-level military talks were held between North and South, with a trust building agenda including the joint excavation of war remains, and the removal of guns and guard posts from both sides of Panmunjom (BBC 2018a). At the same time, the joint liaison office was opened at the North Korean border town of Kaesong in September 2018, with South Korea's then Unification Minister Cho Myoung-gyon celebrating the fact that the two states could 'directly discuss issues 24 hours, 365 days (a year)' (Reuters 2018b).

The Pyongyang Joint Declaration and the accompanying Comprehensive Military Agreement, signed in Pyongyang in September 2018, built on the agenda of the Panmunjom Declaration, fleshing out further areas of cooperation and trust building. The Pyongyang Joint Declaration set out a vision of cooperation projects in the building of infrastructure, joint economic projects, healthcare and environmental conservation (NCNK 2018a). While President Moon and Chairman Kim signed the Pyongyang Joint Declaration, the accompanying Comprehensive Military Agreement was instead signed by South Korean Defense Minister Song Young-moo, together with his North Korean counterpart No Kwang-chol. This document aimed to 'buil(d) trust between the two Koreas through conventional arms control' (Han 2020), on 'land, air and sea' through the creation of buffer zones, peace

zones, and expanding ‘exchanges, cooperation, contacts and visits’ between the two militaries (NCNK 2018b). Importantly for attempts to build trust, a section of the agreement relates to military confidence building measures, including discussions on the establishment of an Inter-Korean Joint Military Committee (NCNK 2018b).

Despite optimistic starts, attempts to build and strengthen trust between South and North Korea at an institutional level were also adversely affected by the fallout from the February 2019 Trump-Kim Hanoi summit (Jo 2019). Attempts to institutionalise military trust building through the creation of a Joint Military Committee never materialised, despite the Moon administration’s repeated calls for it to be implemented (Yonhap 2019). Trust building between the states’ civil bureaucracies suffered an even worse fate, when the North destroyed the joint liaison office in June 2020 (BBC 2020a). However, at the same time, it should be recognised that, together, the Panmunjom Declaration, The Pyongyang Joint Declaration, and the Comprehensive Military Agreement amount to a bold vision for trust building between South and North Korea’s civil and military institutions, that can still potentially be resurrected in the future as long as trust is maintained between South and North Korean leaders. In fact, if these agreements are ever collectively and fully implemented over a sustained period of time, they would potentially go a significant way towards the establishment of a true trusting relationship between the two Koreas. However, in order to improve the atmosphere in which trust building between civil and military institutions and between leaders can occur, both South and North Korean societies need to simultaneously develop their trust in each other. It is this societal level of trust building to which I now turn.

Trust between societies

At a societal level, opportunities for trust building between South and North Korea since 2018 have primarily been pursued through attempts to increase contacts in the fields of

business, tourism, sports and culture. President Moon and Chairman Kim have both strongly aspired to reopen the Kaesong Industrial Complex for joint business ventures, and to restart tours of South Koreans to the North's Mount Kumgang—but these plans have been prevented by international sanctions and US opposition (Park 2019). Cultural exchanges were somewhat more successful, at least initially. In February 2018 the North's Samjiyon Band orchestra performed in the South, leading to a positive reaction from the South Korean audience (Chung 2018). Similarly, in April 2018, a 'North Korean audience respond(ed) enthusiastically' during a concert in Pyongyang that featured South Korean artists (BBC 2018b). While these exchanges have subsequently slowed, the Moon administration has demonstrated its continuing commitment to this goal through the opening of the Inter-Korean Cultural Integration Center in Seoul in May 2020 (Kang 2020). In the sports field, President Moon has sought to build on the legacy of the PyeongChang Winter Olympics, pushing for South and North Korea to field joint teams in future international sporting events. Audaciously, President Moon also supported a proposal for South and North to cooperate on a bid to co-host the 2032 Summer Olympics. Moon and Kim agreed to this plan in the September 2018 Pyongyang Summit, and Moon has since appealed to the International Olympics Committee to support this goal (Choi 2019).

Additionally, public trust on both sides of the peninsula was strengthened through the successful summits of 2018. In March of that year a Gallup Korea poll showed that only 10% of South Korean citizens expressed trust in Chairman Kim. Yet, buoyed by the first Moon-Kim summit, a Korea Research Center poll published in early May 2018 showed that figure jumping sharply to 78% of respondents (Kong 2018). This massive change in public perceptions after a single successful summit points to the important role of political leadership in shaping public opinion. However, this process goes both ways, and, in democratic South Korea at least, it is the public who ultimately choose the leadership. In May

2020 legislative elections, South Korean citizens overwhelmingly supported the pro-engagement ruling Democratic Party, which won by a landslide (McCurry 2020).

Nevertheless, with high levels of partisanship in the country's foreign policy, and a conservative opposition that is deeply sceptical of engagement and trust building with the North (Work 2018), it is essential that trust remains high among the South Korean public if they are to continue to cast their ballots for pro-engagement candidates—especially in upcoming local and presidential elections scheduled for 2022 (Yonhap 2020).

In an effort to reach out directly to the North Korean people, during his September 2018 trip to Pyongyang President Moon delivered a speech to a packed stadium of tens of thousands of local residents. In highly emotional remarks, Moon stressed the shared identity of the Korean people, telling them that 'Kim and I will firmly hold the hands of the 80 million Korean people and will make a new fatherland' (Lee 2018). He also pointed to the economic and security gains that could be achieved, telling the crowd that new agreements would 'completely eliminate military collisions' and that a closer relationship would 'hasten prosperity on the Korean peninsula' (Lee 2018). Although Chairman Kim has not yet reciprocated by travelling to Seoul to address the South Korean people directly, his younger sister Kim Yo Jong made a very favourable impression on many South Koreans when she accompanied a North Korean delegation to the PyeongChang Winter Olympics in February 2018 (Fifield 2018). If President Moon or his successor is able to persuade Chairman Kim to visit a major South Korean city, this would present a considerable opportunity for further trust building between Kim and the South Korean people.

Conclusion: overcoming the trust barrier?

Former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung had a deep appreciation of the need to overcome the trust barrier to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. In his

autobiography he states that, through cooperation, South and North ‘can gradually build trust and common interests’, and reflects that ‘If I leave after building that foundation, I trust that my successors will follow through well’ (Kim D.J. 2019, 659). Despite many challenges, President Moon Jae-in’s contemporary agenda for trust building between South and North has followed Kim Dae-jung’s example, developing stronger foundations that may one day reach the level of a full trusting relationship.

This paper has provided an outline of three levels in which President Moon has sought to build trust with the North: between leaders, civil and military institutions, and societies. I have shown that this trust building has revolved around leadership summits, written agreements, the construction of new institutions, and exchanges at various levels; and that it has been enabled by a focus on shared economic and security interests, as well as the two states’ collective national identity. After many stunning initial successes, progress at all three levels has stalled somewhat since the 2019 Trump-Kim Hanoi Summit (Kasulis 2020). This is not to say, however, that attempts to build trust since 2018 have been wasted. In particular, the enduring trust demonstrated by continuing personal communications between President Moon and Chairman Kim has created a *new normal*, in which both sides consider the other’s interests before acting—and may issue apologies if they fail to meet these trusting expectations.² This has helped to stabilise conditions on the peninsula, preventing a return to the alarming rhetoric and major provocations that Moon faced when he first entered office in 2017.

At the same time, President Moon has recognised that the peninsula’s strategic location at the crossroads of Northeast Asia means that the inter-Korean relationship does not exist in a political vacuum, and at times the South has needed to work hard to mediate

² Chairman Kim reacted to the North’s killing of a South Korean official in its waters by writing a letter of apology to President Moon for ‘disappointing’ him—an unprecedented move for a North Korean leader to make (BBC 2020b).

between Pyongyang and Washington (KBS 2019). Ultimately, further efforts are needed to build trust between the North and other regional actors, principally the US, if conditions are to be produced that enable South and North to permanently overcome the trust barrier. Meanwhile, President Moon will need to continue to show flexibility by adapting his plans with the North, if he is to reinvigorate the trust building process for the remainder of his time in office. Moon will remain president of South Korea until 2022, and much depends on who succeeds him in this role, but in the end history will likely judge his efforts to build trust with the North favourably—as another major step on the journey towards a trusting inter-Korean relationship.

References.

- AFP (2020) South Korea's Moon seeks Kim Jong Un visit to Seoul. Bangkok Post. Accessed from <https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/1830459/south-koreas-moon-seeks-kim-jong-un-visit-to-seoul>
- AP (2019) North's Kim sends condolences to Moon over mother's death. Abc News. Accessed from <https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/norths-kim-sends-condolences-moon-mothers-death-66656566>
- Albert, E. (2020) North Korea's Power Structure. Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed from <https://www.cfr.org/background/north-koreas-power-structure>
- BBC (2018a) Koreas to remove guns and guard posts from Panmunjom 'truce town'. BBC News. Accessed from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-45946924>
- _____ (2018b) Kim Jong-un 'moved' by K-pop peace concert in Pyongyang. BBC News. Accessed from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43616772>
- _____ (2019) Kim Jong-un letter to Seoul asks for more summits in 2019. BBC News. Accessed from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-46714299>

- _____ (2020a) North Korea blows up joint liaison office with South in Kaesong. BBC News. Accessed from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53060620>
- _____ (2020b) Kim Jong-un apologises for killing of South Korean official – South. BBC News. Accessed from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-54291550>
- Berlinger, J., Thompson, N. & E. McKirdy (2018) North and South Korean leaders hold historic summit: Highlights. CNN. Accessed from https://edition.cnn.com/asia/live-news/north-korea-south-korea-summit-intl/h_93eb8f096a50f069c399dd2a359af8f5
- Cheong Wa Dae (2018) Welcoming Remarks by President Moon Jae-in at Dinner for the 2018 Inter-Korean Summit. Accessed from <https://english1.president.go.kr/briefingspeeches/speeches/31>
- Choi, H.S. (2019) Moon requests IOC support for two Koreas' joint bid for 2032 Olympics. The Korea Herald. Accessed from <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20190925000591>
- Chung, J. (2018) North Korean orchestra serenades South Koreans amid protest. Reuters. Accessed from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-olympics-2018-northkorea-orchestra-idUSKBN1FS1Z6>
- Chyzh, O. (2013) Can you trust a dictator: A strategic model of authoritarian regimes' signing and compliance with international treaties. Conflict Management and Peace Science 31:1, 3–27.
- Davenport, K (2013) Park Lays out Korean Trust-Building Plan. Arms Control Association. Accessed from <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013-06/park-lays-out-korean-trust-building-plan>
- Fifield, A. (2018) Kim Yo-jong, the 'Ivanka Trump of North Korea', captivates the South. The Sydney Morning Herald. Accessed from <https://www.smh.com.au/world/kim-yo-jong-the-ivanka-trump-of-north-korea-captivates-the-south-20180211-h0vw1a.html>

- Forsberg, T. (2018) Taking stock of the study of trust in International Relations. In Haukkala, H., De Wetering, C, and J. Vuorelma eds. Trust in International Relations: Rationalist, Constructivist, and Psychological Approaches. Oxford: Routledge.
- George, S., Yeung, J., Griffiths, J., Liptak, K. and J. Berlinger (2019) DMZ: Donald Trump steps into North Korea with Kim Jong Un. CNN. Accessed from https://edition.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-dmz-kim-live-intl-hnk/h_ae61a2361f145681899708bad0ae99d0
- Haas, B. (2018) Kim Jong-un greets Moon Jae-in as inter-Korean summit starts. The Guardian. Accessed from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/18/kim-jong-un-greets-moon-jae-in-as-inter-korean-summit-starts>
- Han, Y.S. (2020) Conventional arms control on the Korean Peninsula: The current state and prospects. Research Paper - 2, Norwegian Institute for International Affairs.
- Hankyoreh (2019) Kim Jong-un declines to visit Busan for S. Korea-ASEAN summit. Hankyoreh. Accessed from http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/918116.html
- Hardin, R. (1993) The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust. Politics & Society 21:4, 505-529.
- Haukkala, H., De Wetering, C, and J. Vuorelma (2018) Introduction: approaching trust and mistrust in International Relations. In Haukkala, H., De Wetering, C, and J. Vuorelma eds. Trust in International Relations: Rationalist, Constructivist, and Psychological Approaches. Oxford: Routledge.
- Hoffman, A.M. (2002) A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations. European Journal of International Relations 8:3, 375-401.
- Hunt, K. & S. Jeong (2018) Here's what Kim and Moon said when they met for the first time. CNN. Accessed from <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/04/27/asia/moon-jae-in-kim-jong-un-first-meeting-what-they-said-intl/index.html>

- Jo, H.R. (2019) One year on, inter-Korean military pact remains unfulfilled promise. The Korea Herald. Accessed from <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20190917000716>
- Jung, D.M. (2020) Lack of alternatives keeps Moon's approval rating high. The Korea Times. Accessed from https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2020/10/356_297455.html
- Johnson, J. (2020) North Korea severs hotlines in message to South — and U.S. Japan Times. Accessed from <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/06/09/asia-pacific/north-korea-severs-hotlines-south-korea-us-nuclear-weapons/>
- Kang, S.W. (2020) Center opens to narrow inter-Korean cultural differences. The Korea Times. Accessed from https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2020/09/103_290769.html
- Kasulis, K. (2020) Diplomacy stalled a year after Trump-Kim Summit collapse. Al Jazeera. Accessed from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/2/27/diplomacy-stalled-a-year-after-trump-kim-summit-collapse>
- KBS (2019) Moon Seeks to Mediate between Trump and Kim Jong-un. KBS World Radio. Accessed from http://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?SeqCode=143401&lang=e
- Kim, D.J. (2000) Kim Dae-jung Nobel Lecture. The Nobel Prize. Accessed from <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2000/dae-jung/lecture/>
- _____ (2019) Conscience in Action: The Autobiography of Kim Dae-jung. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kim, J. (2020) Letters revealed: North and South Korea exchange well wishes over COVID-19. NK News. Accessed from <https://www.nknews.org/2020/09/letters-revealed-north-and-south-korea-exchange-well-wishes-over-covid-19/>

- Kim, T.H. (2018) Unfinished business: Moon's summit dreams echo late mentor. AP News. Accessed from <https://apnews.com/article/d540bafc6ac6478f8f2aa27d14af326d>
- Kong, K. (2018) Nearly 80 Percent of South Koreans Say They Trust Kim Jong Un, Poll Finds. Time. Accessed from <https://time.com/5262437/kim-jong-un-trust-south-korea-poll/>
- Korea Herald (2013) Lee defends his North Korea policy. The Korea Herald. Accessed from <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130219000737>
- Kretschmer, F. (2018) Why the Iran nuclear deal's collapse is a disaster for North Korea. Deutsche Well. Accessed from <https://www.dw.com/en/why-the-iran-nuclear-deals-collapse-is-a-disaster-for-north-korea/a-43734409>
- Kydd, A.H. (2000) Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation. *International Organization* 54:2, 325-357.
- _____ (2007) *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Landler, M. (2018) Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned. *New York Times*. Accessed from <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html>
- Lee, C.M. & Botto, K. (2018) *Korea Strategic Review: President Moon Jae-in and the Politics of Inter-Korean Détente*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Accessed from https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Korean_Strategic_Review_2018_FULL.pdf
- Lee, J.H. (2018) Moon gets 'standing ovation' after first ever speech by South Korean leader to North Koreans. *SCMP*. Accessed from <https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/2164932/moon-gets-standing-ovation-after-first-ever-speech-south-korean>

- Lipson, C. (2003) *Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace*.
Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- March, J.G. & J.P. Olsen (2011) *The Logic of Appropriateness*, in Goodin, R.E. ed. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McCurry, J. (2020) South Korea's ruling party wins election landslide amid coronavirus outbreak. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/16/south-koreas-ruling-party-wins-election-landslide-amid-coronavirus-outbreak>
- Mercer, J. (2005) *Rationality and Psychology in International Politics*. *International Organization* 59:1, 77-106.
- MOFA (2018) *Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula* (2018.4.27). Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed from https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5478/view.do?seq=319130&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=&page=1&titleNm=
- Moon, C. (2011). *Between Principle and Pragmatism: What Went Wrong with the Lee Myung-bak Government's North Korean Policy?* *Journal of International and Area Studies* 18: 2, 1-22.
- NCNK (2018a) *Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018*. The National Committee on North Korea. Accessed from <https://www.ncnk.org/node/1633>
- _____ (2018b) *Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain*. The National Committee on North Korea. Accessed from <https://www.ncnk.org/sites/default/files/Agreement%20on%20the%20Implementation%20of%20the%20Historic%20Panmunjom%20Declaration%20in%20the%20Military%20Domain.pdf>

- Noack, R. & J.S. Lee (2018) The historic Kim-Moon meeting as it unfolded. Washington Post. Accessed from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/04/27/the-historic-kim-moon-meeting-as-it-unfolded/>
- Park, C.K (2019) Kim and Moon want to resume joint Korean projects – but the US has to agree first. SCMP. Accessed from <https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/2181551/kim-and-moon-want-resume-joint-korean-projects-us-has-agree>
- Reuters (2018a) Kim Jong-un invites South Korean President Moon to Pyongyang. ABC News. Accessed from <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-02-10/kim-jong-un-invites-south-koreas-moon-to-pyongyang/9419326>
- _____ (2018b) North and South Korea open liaison office as ties warm further. The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/14/north-and-south-korea-open-liaison-office-as-ties-warm-further>
- Ruzicka, J. & V.C. Keating (2015) Going global: Trust research and international relations, *Journal of Trust Research* 5:1, 8-26.
- Salmon, A. (2020) Kim sends Moon virus ‘comfort’ letter. Asia Times. Accessed from <https://asiatimes.com/2020/03/kim-sends-moon-virus-comfort-letter/>
- Shin, H.H. & J. Lee (2018) Fulfilling a dream, South Korea's Moon visits sacred North Korean mountain with Kim. Reuters. Accessed from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-southkorea-summit-mountain-idUSKCN1M006F>
- Stiles, K.W. (2018) *Trust and Hedging in International Relations*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Straits Times (2017) South Korea president Moon Jae In's main policy pledges. The Straits Times. Accessed from <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/south-korean-presidential-shoo-in-moon-jae-ins-main-policy-pledges>

Work, C. (2018) South Korea's Domestic Political Divide on North Korea. The Diplomat.

Accessed from <https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/south-koreas-domestic-political-divide-on-north-korea/>

Yang, H.K. and H.H Shin (2018) Person to person: North and South Korea get neighbourly

with direct hot line. Reuters. Accessed from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-hotline/person-to-person-north-and-south-korea-get-neighbourly-with-direct-hot-line-idUSKBN1HR1G9>

Yonhap (2019) Seoul calls for prompt operation of inter-Korean joint military committee.

Yonhap News Agency. Accessed from <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20190809007500325>

_____ (2020) Over 4 in 10 Koreans want ruling party to win 2022 presidential race: poll.

Yonhap News Agency. Accessed from <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20201007002800315>