

# Analytical essay on the Roles of the International Community for Peace on the Korean Peninsula.

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## **Introduction**

The 'Peace Regime' on the Korean peninsula, within the contemporary context of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, fundamentally describes the process of maintaining national security in both North and South Korea, which can be accomplished by identifying possible areas of conflict and resolving those issues before the occurrence of deadly clashes. Hence, it is essential to first acquire stability in the fluctuating diplomatic tensions and therefore maintaining peace between North Korea and other surrounding nations which will then act as steppingstones towards a peace-driven economy and further rapprochement before seeking to achieve the ultimate goal of unification of the two Koreas.

This analytical paper aims to examine the perspectives and the roles of key nations involved in the peace process of the Korean peninsula and further unfold how these nations as an international community could harmoniously interact with both North and South Korea to provide assistance along the pathway of peace.

## **Background**

Tracing back the division of Korea, the end of World War II in 1945, marked by the atomic bombing in Japan; Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is ironically the starting point as it had brought further conflicts amongst the superpowers of the allies; United States and the former Soviet Union. With the arising geopolitical tensions, the Cold War broke out in 1947 and subsequently, the two nation's effort to secure their political, economic, and ideological dominance had then intervened through the Korean War in 1950.

Since the atomic bombing in Japan, nations across the world began fearing all forms of nuclear weaponry, not only of its devastating physical explosiveness, but also the unprecedented aftermaths as seen in Japan. Consequently, nuclear weapons have evolved to a form of military power, inducing rapid development and prevalence around the globe. Similarly, Kim Il-Sung, the first Supreme Leader of North Korea, had acknowledged and followed this trend, enforcing the Byungjin doctrine which insisted on the synchronised economic and nucleic development (Tan 2019). Eventually, the prevalence of nuclear arsenals became a threat to the entire human race in case of nuclear warfare in the future. United Nations, in support of various other countries, had begun upholding the concept of denuclearisation, prohibiting the hold and further proliferation of nuclear arsenals. However, the current Supreme Leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-Un had declined to surrender the nuclear development and had continued to pursue his grandfather's policy until today. Hence, denuclearisation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is at utmost priority for the security of other nations as well as it being the first step towards the peace regime on the Korean peninsula.

The Korean War had not yet been officially ended, but rather been left ambiguously on a stalemate due to the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement in 1953 instead of a permanent peace treaty. Unfortunately, the two states have endured this status for a prolonged period as their relationship repeatedly advanced and receded, failing to meet common grounds. Although the persistent efforts made by relevant organisations and key nations established slow and gradual progression of inter-Korean relations, it only took moments to ruin these progressions. Specific examples would include consistent missile testings despite the inter-Korean summits and more recently, the public demolition of the inter-Korean Joint Liaison Office in Kaesong. Thus, demonstrating that the process to peace on the Korean peninsula will require arduous and long-term strategies of the international community.

The current president of Republic of Korea (ROK), Moon Jae-In, calls for action from the international community as announced during the most recent UN summit. Moon had highlighted that Seoul alone is unable to establish peace on the peninsula and thus, support and advice from the international community are needed to produce steady advancements towards the peace process (Irish Examiner 2019).

### **USA's position in bringing peace on the Korean peninsula**

The United States of America (USA) has played a pivotal role in constructing the history of Korea up until today. Indisputably, USA had actively engaged in the Korean War since the beginning to hinder the expansion and the domination of communism in the continent of Asia (U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2018). If South Korea was conquered during the Korean War, it is likely to have reduced the strategic presence and influence of US in the Asia-Pacific region, which would then place other allies of US within the region into greater pressure of communist powers. Hence the reason why the US had exhibited strong determination to secure South Korea as their ally.

The US remains deeply involved in political and military affairs of post-war Korea to prevent wider conflict by enhancing South Korea's national security and eventually aiming to recover stability on the peninsula. Being in the arms of the most powerful democratic nation safeguards the peace process of Korea as it publicly demonstrates the US commitment to protect its allies. As a matter of fact, the deployment of US's military aircraft and other military assets in South Korea not only deters potential initiation of armed attacks from other nations, but further applies pressure on the opposing parties, especially DPRK and China (Lee & Botto 2019). For example, the US-ROK combined military exercises have unarguably maintained peace and stability on the Korean peninsula by raising awareness of the neighbouring nations on the fitness and capability to immediately retaliate to aggressive actions that are simply 'crossing the line'. Essentially, these consistent exercises would deter any experimental behaviours of the oppositions.

Thus, the presence of US military forces on the Korean peninsula enables the US to exert power within the region. This political leverage of the US is crucial, especially in protecting its allies from the rapidly growing political and economic influence of China in the Asia continent. In fact, all the US allies, ironically, trade more with China than the US (Lee & Botto 2019), indicating that most of the economies of US allies are already interrelated and heavily reliant on China. The presence and the diplomatic influence of Washington becomes increasingly imperative within this context as they exclusively carry potential power to counterbalance the overwhelming economic leverage of China on numerous economies including ROK. For instance, US had applied sanctions on Chinese and Russian companies that were trading with North Korea, which practically nullified the US and UN economic sanctions on DPRK (Hemmings, Pardo & Kong 2018). Essentially, the US impedes China's domination on the Korean peninsula and the overarching Asia continent as the domination of the Chinese communist party will certainly generate difficulties in designing a peaceful progression towards the unification of democratic Korea.

Within similar notions, the US also protects Pyongyang from exploitative foreign investments, especially on North Korea's rare earth minerals and other natural resources (Hemmings, Pardo & Kong 2018). Although these investments may seem beneficial for DPRK in short terms, these resources are crucial for future developments of the Korean peninsula.

The absolute priority of the USA is to strengthen the military power which is used as a key of deterrence against armed threats and therefore breach the peace in USA and its allies (U.S.

DEPARTMENT of STATE 2018). However, the previous administrations of the former president of America, George Bush, had strategically failed in preventing North Korea's obtainment and proliferation of nuclear arsenals. This omission has evolved into a threat, challenging the national security of the US and its allies. Hence, US's greatest motivation regarding peace on the Korean peninsula is the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, which would primarily be the complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation of DPRK, yet, simultaneously, sustaining their strategic presence in the Asia-Pacific region (Hemmings, Pardo & Kong 2018).

The past US administrations, including Clinton, Bush, and Obama, had equipped a relatively passive attitude in their diplomatic affairs with DPRK, taking cautious and gradual steps towards denuclearisation and thereby maintaining the status quo (Aum et al. 2020). Perhaps, they had not anticipated such a prolonged survival of the Kim regime, despite the heavy imposition of sanctions. On the other hand, the latest Trump administration has perceived the denuclearisation matter as the utmost security concern of US. Hence, implementing the 'maximum pressure and engagement' approach by employing a rather pragmatic measure to initiate regular discussions towards a compromised conclusion (Aum et al. 2020). Additionally, President Trump has utilised the diplomatic and military pressure, as discussed above, to bring the leader of DPRK onto the negotiating table to convey Trump's sincerity regarding denuclearisation and further take remarkable and extensive steps towards a collaborative peace process rather than relying solely on sanctions to resolve the peace-threatening issues (Aum et al. 2020). Trump have further motivated the summits with Kim through temporary stoppage of US-ROK joint military trainings and hinting possibilities of economic sanction reliefs.

What was back then at a fragile and vulnerable state had now become a relatively stable nation. The current prosperity of Seoul would have been difficult without the assistance from the US since post-war. As explored, the US's role in peacefully addressing contemporary diplomatic challenges with DPRK is crucial. The US enables ROK to overcome the obstacles that can not be defeated on its own and further supports in achieving shared goals of denuclearisation (Lee & Botto 2019). Thus, US, together with ROK, strongly advocates for a peaceful progression on the Korean peninsula.

### **Japan's position in bringing peace on the Korean peninsula**

Japan's interest on the inter-Korean relationships are reflected in their multiple attempts to normalise their diplomatic ties with North Korea with the intention of maintaining their leverage within the Asian region. However, these missions had failed until 2002 where the two states had finally agreed on a joint declaration with DPRK admitting to the abduction of Japanese citizens and Japan sincerely expressing remorse for its colonial past (Aum et al. 2020). Nonetheless, this joint declaration had not yet proven its efficacy in improving the relationship of the two nations.

Under current contexts, the former Prime Minister of Japan, Abe, had focused in ensuring Japanese national security and resolving the abductees issue in their diplomatic affairs with North Korea. Although the aims of national security are overlapping with every other nation, this matter had been further threatening for Tokyo as DPRK had previously launched multiple missiles which flew across the Japanese territory since 1998, demonstrating their capability to attack Japan at any time (Aum et al. 2020). Hence, Japan adds more weight onto the internationally shared goals of DPRK's elimination of weapons of mass destruction, denuclearisation. On the other hand, Japan holds a distinctive goal of drawing a peaceful resolution on the abductions issue to prevent further complications in the future, which may interfere with the peace process of Korea. Although 4-5

decades have passed, this incident remains unforgotten. Perhaps, the return of the abductees is more urgent than the denuclearisation of North Korea as Abe has numerously raised his concerns and appealed, or rather demanded the international society to publicise the abductions issue (Hemmings, Pardo & Kong 2018). However, most nations appear to be overlooking seriousness of Tokyo's concerns as they devoted more time on DPRK's denuclearisation.

Japan had not yet been directly involved in negotiating for a peace process in the Korean peninsula but had rather been limited to playing a supportive role, providing economic assistance as outlined in the joint declaration in 2002. With these financial assistances, low interest loans, and humanitarian aids, which also compensates for the tragic history of Korea, Abe seeks to thaw the frozen relationship with Pyongyang (Haruki 2019). Once the relationship is revitalised, Japan anticipates being directly involved in discussions for shaping peace on the Korean peninsula, essentially gaining leverage on the Asian theatre and most importantly, negotiating directly with Kim to achieve their predominant objectives of their citizen's homecoming. Additionally, considering Japan's substantial leverage over UN's multilateral sanctions, Suga may stimulate this process by offering to partially lift economic sanctions from UN as well as ones of their own (Hiraiwa 2020).

The South Korean president, Moon's perspectives align with Abe's big picture as he had been emphasising the importance of Japan's contributions for building peace on the Korean peninsula in 2018. Moon had further expressed his support in normalising Japan and DPRK's bilateral ties, expecting the improved intimacy of the two nations to bring further effectiveness of Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo's collaborative efforts towards a peace process (KBS World 2018). It is understandable that Japan-North Korea diplomatic relations will not reach a cordial state if the resolution of the abduction problem is not made, especially with Abe's consistent and burdensome efforts. Consequently, this will trigger a chain reaction where the lack of Japan's connection with DPRK will reduce their potency in promoting peace on the Korean peninsula. In acknowledgement of this fact, Moon had manifested his commitment in resolving the matter as he raised the Japanese concerns during the 2018 inter-Korean summit (KBS World 2018).

### **China's position in bringing peace on the Korean peninsula**

China has shown ambition in acquiring political hegemony and rapid economic growth through a boundless international trade market. To achieve these aspirations, the Chinese government had aggressively engaged in global infrastructure development, investment, economic aid, and manifested great interest in expanding their territory in attempt to obtain dominant geopolitical presence across the Asia-Pacific region (Aum et al. 2020). This is evidenced by China's involvement in the South China Sea dispute and the recent skirmish against India. Analogously, China has shown great interest in participating throughout the peace process of the Korean peninsula as they are aware of its potential impacts in their future geopolitical and geostrategic leverage within the Asian theatre.

Simultaneously, Beijing utterly desires to sustain their border security against other nations. Although China is North Korea's one of the few formal alliances with congruent political directions, the relationship of the two nations had been fluctuating over the decades, especially due to the belligerent behaviour of Kim; audaciously conducting missile and nuclear tests in 2017 (USIP 2019). Despite such adventurous attitude, the Chinese officials had advocated for the 'No War, No Chaos, No Nuclear Weapons' approach as the foundation of their diplomatic stance to resolve the problems surrounding the Korean peninsula (Aum et al. 2020). This peaceful procedure has been adopted as

the China's President Xi became aware of the irreversible damage of war and the potential collapse of DPRK's regime on the rapidly developing nation of China as the loss of a buffer state against US would induce greater pressure on China's national security and the overflowing numbers of North Korean refugees of both scenarios will be unmanageable (Kim et al. 2017). Xi adhered to the centrist views on somewhat cooperating with the US sanctions on North Korea under the condition of not causing lethal economic damage which may lead to the destabilisation of DPRK's regime (Hemmings, Pardo & Kong 2018). Hence, China had continued in aiding DPRK for the purpose of preventing the potential impacts of North Korea's instability on their own borders and to sustain their relationship. China is likely to uphold similar peaceful processes where they can relieve North Korea from US economic sanctions and perhaps solicit on behalf of Kim to negotiate for advantageous protocols which would ideally consist of the dismissal of US military force from the peninsula (USIP 2019).

The presence of armed forces of US and military assets on the peninsula is another significant threat to the Chinese border security. In addition, the strengthened defence forces of the nearby US allies, South Korea and Japan, and their potential prospects of development of nuclear weapons are all blamed on North Korea's resistance against denuclearisation (Aum et al. 2020). This indicates that the two superpowers, China and the US, pursues the shared goal of denuclearisation and peace on the Korean peninsula, despite their deteriorating political relationship. The underlying rationales of their shared goals are also alike, consisting of elimination of threats on the national security and possession of regional hegemony (Yoon 2019). However, the ideal scenarios of the US and China on denuclearisation are quite contrasting. As mentioned previously, the US, led by Trump, poses an 'All-or-Nothing' approach whereas Chinese views are more aligned with DPRK's progressive and incremental movements on gradually dismantling nuclear arsenals in exchange of sanction reliefs. China had been promoting a 'Parallel track' negotiations, where both the US-ROK military exercises and North Korea's missile and nuclear tests on the Korean peninsula are suspended to establish an unpressurised, peaceful negotiation programme (USIP 2019). Hence, China has not abided with the US's implementations of strong economic sanctions on DPRK but had rather reduced its effectiveness as China's trade with DPRK remained unaffected of these pressures. Furthermore, in the recent years of 2018-19, Kim has consulted Xi on multiple occasions to seek advice on diplomatic directions with Trump and Moon (USIP 2019). This is indicative of China's influence on DPRK and their role as an advisor, not only economically, but also in regard to international relations. Therefore, US must implement economic sanctions in accordance with China to critically strike North Korea's economy as they potentially carry predominant influence, being responsible for 90% of DPRK's total international trades (Choo et al. 2019).

However, Beijing is unlikely to support Trump's imposition of heavy sanctions as Xi insists on smaller steps for an establishment of trust in order to achieve a 'peaceful' process of denuclearisation (Kim et al. 2017). Moreover, the ongoing trade war between Beijing and Washington leaves a question mark on whether Xi would show any interest in holding hands with Trump to implement powerful sanctions on DPRK or at least make partial contributions to Trump's strategy towards denuclearisation. Another pathway that Xi would consider is to utilise Pyongyang as a medium to negotiate for denuclearisation in exchange of common goals between DPRK and China, which will be a win-win scenario of the communist states against the US. In this situation, China may motivate Kim through an invitation to join the 'Belt and Road Initiative' to hasten DPRK's economic development (Hemmings, Pardo & Kong 2018). Simultaneously, by developing closer political and economic ties with North Korea, Xi expects a rise in China's leverage as DPRK's economy becomes further dependent on China. Additionally, Xi anticipates exclusive access to North Korea's mineral reserves, which would significantly strengthen China's economy. Although this route would eventually achieve

the ultimate objective of denuclearisation, the overall benefits would be tilted towards China, which consequently means that it will be unsupported by the US (USIP 2019).

If peace progresses and reaches an agreement for denuclearisation, China, as one of the five nuclear weapon states approved by the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, would be permitted to provide North Korea with technical assistance in safely dismantling nuclear arsenals and minimising nuclear waste contamination risks (Aum et al. 2020).

The Chinese government is confronted by two roads, diverged, where one views North Korea as an effective buffer against the U.S.-ROK alliance, and the other portraying it as a timed bomb on China's borders (Choo et al. 2019). Under Xi's determination to maintain the priority areas such as border security, DPRK's denuclearisation, and reduction of US involvement in the Asian theatre, China would seek a peace regime in either paths (Yoon 2019). For China, some short-term steps towards a peace process can be initiated by fostering an end-of-war declaration and advocating for North Korea's economic stability through voicing for partial ease of sanctions. Other long-lasting measures involve the provision of security assurance and the possible inclusion North Korea as their umbrella partner, if desired (USIP 2019). Although China may not transfer direct financial assistance, a temporary access to China's belt and road initiative and consistency of the trade flow would certainly mitigate excessive economic sanctions, enabling Kim to be confident in moving forward.

### **Russia's position in bringing peace on the Korean peninsula**

The flourishing bilateral relationship between North Korea and the former Soviet Union had spontaneously diminished with the collapse of the USSR. Since then, Russia had begun to somewhat favour the South over the North. However, their overall level of diplomatic participation on the Korean peninsula were relatively low in comparison to other superpowers who seized similar weight of political leverage at the time, such as China and the US. As a result of lack of interest and investment, Russia's influence on the Korean peninsula has declined over the decades, being neglected from major peace negotiations for Korea despite their regional proximity (Hemmings, Pardo & Kong 2018).

The recent increase of Russia's involvement in Korea's peace process is mainly driven by their interest on economic growth and the sustainment of their great power status within the continent of Asia (Aum et al. 2020). For example, Russia has designed to install oil pipelines in near future, which would run down from the Russian Far East, through the North Korean territory, and eventually reaching South Korea and Japan, enabling fluent crude oil trades and expanding their economic leverage over these Asian markets. These investments are made in accordance to Russia's speculation where their energy exports will meet the growing demands of the global leaders of technology, South Korea and Japan (Weitz 2010). Furthermore, Russia had discussed for the linkage of trans-Korean railroad with Russia's rail system, where South Korean trades with Russia, as well as Europe, will be greatly boosted and in return, Russia will gain economic leverage as they wish to become a transiting country between Europe and ROK (Weitz 2010). This essentially distributes China's economic dominance in Asia and further offers to reduce other neighbouring nation's economic reliance on China. Thus, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, has become aware of the impact of the changing Korean peninsula's diplomatic direction on achieving their model of economic development.

Hence, Putin had begun to express his interest on the Korean peninsula by hosting the Putin-Kim summit in 2019. This meeting not only demonstrates his ambitions on being involved in shaping

peace on the Korean peninsula to the two leaders of Korea, Moon and Kim, but also reveals Russia's growing leverage on North Korea to other surrounding international communities. By reawakening the bilateral relationship with DPRK, Putin seeks to construct cooperative economic advancements, and ultimately to be enrolled as a mediator role during the peace process, using the consequent increase of leverage over North Korea (Gabuev 2019).

Russia's perspective on North Korea's denuclearisation are congruent with the general trend of the neighbouring international communities. Yet, Putin has rather taken a passive stance regarding this issue as he does not believe that North Korea's nuclear weapons pose a direct threat to Russia's national security. This outlook may be true as the historical ties and economic developments of DPRK and Russia is believed to prevent Russia from being threatened by Kim's nuclear arsenals (Choo et al. 2019). It is further supported by the views of numerous Russian analysts, who emphasise that Kim's nuclear arsenals are only for defensive purposes, acting as a deterrence against threats on their own borders (Barannikova 2019). Analogously, Kim had specifically mentioned that the security and the future of their state was guaranteed forever with nuclear weapons, during the military parade speech on the 10<sup>th</sup> of October 2020.

Perhaps, Russia is more likely to fear from the risks involved on the process of denuclearisation which could include military conflicts between North Korea against US and their allies or excessive economic sanctions imposed on Pyongyang (Barannikova 2019). These risks could potentially lead to complications such as DPRK's regime collapse where China and Russia would suffer from the burdens of the overflowing refugees. Hence the reason why Russia has been reluctant in strengthening sanctions on North Korea and had further employed North Korean labours in industries located in Russian Far East to further support the economic flow of DPRK (Hemmings, Pardo & Kong 2018).

Since the utmost priority of Russia is to avoid heightening political tensions which would possibly damage their economy, the dual freeze scenario is ideal for Russia as Putin much more prefers a stable North Korea over a denuclearised one (Barannikova 2019). Without doubt, a gradual process, consisting of incremental steps, is the most effective and safe approach towards denuclearisation as it simultaneously minimises the risk of rising political tensions.

Putin had furthermore denounced Trump's 'big deal' approach, hyperbolising that "They'd rather eat grass than abandon their [nuclear weapons] programme unless they feel secure." Hence, Putin had held hands with China in 2018, promoting the roadmap of dual freeze mechanism as a realistic tool to initiate slow progressions through establishing security assurances (Aum et al. 2020). Since the US is a common rival of both Russia and China, the dual freeze proposal is greatly favoured as it is fundamentally killing two birds with one stone. The decreased US military exercise would temporarily sedate the military tensions, giving more leverage to Russia in the Asia-Pacific region and the ceased missile and nuclear practices would be the first step towards a peaceful denuclearisation, preventing possible outbreaks of war. Thus, Russia views the nuclear crisis as an opportunity to demonstrate its relevance as a great power in Asia and move forward with its regional economic initiatives (Choo et al. 2019).

### **India's position in bringing peace on the Korean peninsula**

The significant role of India throughout the history of Korea and their unique diplomatic position is very much underrated. India had been consistently upholding the values of peace as demonstrated by their refusal to fight in the Korean war, but instead providing medical service to treat the

wounded soldiers of both Koreas, as directed by the former Indian prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru (Singh 2019). Furthermore, India had actively participated in peace campaigns hosted by UN during and after the Korean war, which contributed to the Armistice Agreement in 1953. Hence, India had maintained a neutral stance amongst the oppositions. However, as the Cold War continued after the Armistice Agreement, India was no longer able to be engaged with both Koreas and gradually lost influence on the Korean peninsula as they were regionally distant compared to other major neighbouring nations (Dhawan 2020). Perhaps, the Indian government had not felt the urge to actively promote denuclearisation and seek a role in the peace-building process for similar reasons.

In early 1990s, India began to build soft power by strengthening economic ties with both Koreas. Although, UN's trade sanctions on North Korea, in 2016-17, severely reduced the trade ties between the two nations, India remain as the second largest trade partner with DPRK after China as they continued to proceed with food and pharmaceutical supplies (Mishra 2018). Moreover, India had also provided 'Space Science and Technology' education to North Korean students, despite UN's initial sanction in 2006. On that account, India has manifested consistency throughout their peace-building process as they refuted what they perceived as misleading or unfair, whilst strictly adhering to other necessary implementations. More recently, V.K. Singh's, Minister of State for External Affairs, official visit to DPRK in 2018 had successfully concluded as both parties agreed on strengthening their diplomatic relations by exchanging education, agriculture, and pharmaceuticals (MEA 2018).

Similarly, India's bilateral relation with South Korea continued to expand, reaching a total of 22 billion USD in 2018 and it is further speculated to be increased up to 50 billion USD by 2030. Hence, peace on the Korean peninsula has become a greater interest for India as instability in ROK will undoubtedly impact the Indian economy (Kim & Singh 2020). President Moon of ROK had also visited Prime Minister of India, Shri Narendra Modi in 2018 to elaborate on the shared vision for peace and prosperity and therefore bracing the strategic partnership of the two nations, by not only upholding mutual economic growth, but also ensuring each other's national security through military exchanges and collaborative trainings (MEA 2018). The Indian government had expressed commitment and support towards the global non-proliferation efforts on nuclear weapons and further offered to play a mediator role to promote the process of peace (Kim & Singh 2020).

As discussed, India has retained a neutral stance, maintaining high levels of trust with numerous nations as they have not left any traumatising historical legacies. More specifically, the cordial relation between India and DPRK was highlighted during the same conference in 2018, "The DPRK side emphasised that as a friendly country DPRK will never allow any action that would create concerns for India's security.", regarding India's concern in the context of nuclear proliferation (MEA 2018). Thus, India is capable of playing a rather flexible role in bringing peace on the Korean peninsula. One of the main advantage of India's global diplomatic position is that they could be employed as a medium for communication between DPRK and other nations and assist in finding middle grounds through negotiations. In addition, India could host future peace summits, inviting DPRK and other key nations to foster the peace process (Dhawan 2020). India could also collaborate with ROK to provide coordinated services that would certainly be appreciated by DPRK, such as providing humanitarian aids for North Korean citizens who are suffering from international sanctions. This not only improves the reputability on the public diplomacy of ROK for future peace process, but also prevents unexpected breakouts of war due to frustration of the uncontrollable impacts of excessive sanctions.

## **Conclusion**

Ironically, despite the shared goal of a 'Peace Regime' on the Korean peninsula, the international communities explored have presented contrasting perspectives on its process. These perspectives are largely divided into two, US and Japan alliance on one hand, Sino-Russian entente on the other, and India sitting on the fence, sustaining a neutral stance. The US-Japanese side promotes the need for sweeping changes whereas the Sino-Russian side advocates for a gradual procedures. Although numerous summits had taken place amongst these nations, the direction of the Korean Peace Regime had remained undecided. Perhaps, the lack of trust and the elevated political tensions, as well as greed for exclusive benefits of the key nations had decelerated the peace process.

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